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ABSTRACT
This study evaluates the harbor of Hong Kong as a
typhoon haven. Characteristics of the harbor under tropical
cyclone conditions, including topographical effects on the
wind, storm surge and reliability of moorings and anchorages
are discussed and highlighted by two case studies (Typhoon
ROSE, August 1971 and Typhoon WANDA, September 1962). Problem
areas to be considered if remaining in port and possible
evasion procedures for ships sailing from the port are examined
for tropical cyclones approaching from various directions.
Tropical cyclone tracks for 87 years of data (1884-1970) for
the western North Pacific Ocean are examined in order to
determine the probability of threat to the port of Hong Kong.
Results suggest early sortie action under threatening condi-
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In the western North Pacific area the typhoon stands as
one of the most fearsome weather elements for a ship to
encounter. One of the major decisions that must often be
considered by Fleet units is whether to seek or remain in the
shelter of a harbor, or to take evasive action and ride out
the storm at sea.
This study considers the single port of Hong Kong in terms
of its characteristics to serve as a "typhoon haven." Due to
the many variables involved, (i.e., topography, different
directions of approach of tropical cyclones, holding action of
the bottom, size and speed of the ship, etc.) it is often not
possible to stamp a certain harbor simply as "safe" or "unsafe.
However, the information that follows is intended to aid the
local commander in making this decision. The judgement to
sortie and leave a particular port is not solely determined by
meteorological considerations, but also depends on other fac-
tors, such as the "measure of the harbor."
1.2 THE MEASURE OF A HARBOR
"The measure of a harbor is the sum total of
many individual factors . It is in the extent of its
shelter 3 depth of water at the piers 3 quantity and
condition of its service craft and the efficiency of
its port services . It is measured by the experience
level of its port services officer . It is in the
skillj spirit and will of his crews. It is in the
emergency capability of the Ship Repair Facility to
make a ship ready for sea. It is the quality of the
typhoon warning service and the lead time provided
the Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOFA) to make
sound command decisions and to the Port Services
Officer to carry out smoothly and efficiently his
flexible plan of action. Finally 3 the measure of a
harbor is knowledge of that harbor and all that it
connotes in the mind of the Senior Officer Present
Afloat who 3 by his decisions 3 will stamp it as a
-12-
vital refuge to be taken or as an inanimate limited
shelter to refuse as a harbor for the ships under
his charge." (U. S. Fleet Weather Facility, Yokosuka,
1967)
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2. THE PORT OF HONG KONG
2.1 GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
Figure 1 shows the general location of Hong Kong in the
western North Pacific. Figure 2 shows the relative orienta-
tion of the Island of Hong Kong and harbor along the China
coast and the significant topographical features.
Figure 3 is a close-up of the area outlined in Figure 2,
showing the harbor sea lanes, moorings, and anchorages.
2.2 THE HARBOR
The harbor of Hong Kong, located at approximately 22. 3N
and 114. 2E, lies between the north side of Hong Kong Island
and the China mainland. The harbor varies in width from one
to six n mi and covers an area of 23 square n mi. The harbor
and anchorage areas vary in depth from 3 to 6 fathoms, with
1 to 6 fathoms at the berths. The tidal rise varies from
3.1 to 5.3 ft. Depths of approaches and entrances to the
2harbor are given as follows (refer to Figures 2 and 3 for
locations) :
a. East approach: Tathong Channel -- 6% to 10 fathoms
b. East entrance: Lei U Mun Channel -- 13 fathoms
c. West approach: West Lamma Channel -- 4% to 5 fathoms
East Lamma Channel -- 4% to 10 fathoms
d. West entrance: Sulphur Channel -- 4 to 14 fathoms
Port facilities relating to availability of berths,
naval mooring classifications, and towage facilities are
given in Appendix A.
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3.1 TROPICAL CYCLONES IN WESTPAC
By joint international agreement, tropical cyclones in
the western North Pacific Ocean (WESTPAC) area are classified
according to their intensity as follows:
Tropical Depression - maximum sustained winds not
exceeding 33 kt
- maximum sustained winds between
34 and 63 kt
- maximum sustained winds 64 kt or
greater
However, the Royal Observatory Hong Kong (ROHK), located on
Kowloon (see Figure 3 for location), utilizes one further
classification by subdividing "Tropical Storm" into two cate-
gories as follows (Marine Department, Hong Kong, 1970):
Tropical Storm - maximum sustained winds between
34 and 47 kt
Severe Tropical Storm - maximum sustained winds between
48 and 63 kt
Tropical cyclones are low pressure vortices which develop
with warm-core centers, and are differentiated from mid-latitude
(extratropi cal , cold-core) lows by their area of origin (usually
in the tropics), their dynamics, and the characteristics of the
surrounding air masses. The "birth" of these low pressure
centers usually takes place between latitude 25N and 25S,
except yery near the equator. Like typical low pressure
systems, the wind circulation in a tropical cyclone is counter-
clockwise about its center in the Northern Hemisphere and
clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere.
A typhoon can be thought of as a giant "heat engine" that
obtains the energy to grow and sustain itself from the warm
ocean waters over which it travels. Empirical data indicates
that sea-surface temperatures exceeding 26C (78. 8F) allow the
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initial formation of a tropical cyclone. Such sea-surface
temperatures are prevalent over the warm tropical waters,
hence this is usually not a limitation in low latitudes.
However, if the source of energy supply is decreased or cut
off (e.g., by a typhoon moving over a major land area) the
system will soon weaken and die. A full fledged "super
typhoon" can sustain winds of 130 kt with gusts exceeding
175 kt and such storms do occur on occasion in WESTPAC.
Tropical cyclones are largely steered by upper level
winds (between 5,000 and 30,000 ft above the surface),
although many other meteorological parameters must also be
considered when movement is to be predicted. The general
path is towards the west-northwest in the Northern Hemisphere,
however, it is not uncommon for a typhoon to make an occasional
"loop" in its track. "Recurvature" in the Northern Hemisphere
takes place when the westward progression of the tropical
cyclone begins to cease and a more northerly and finally
northeasterly direction results. Once the tropical cyclone
or typhoon recurves into the mid-latitudes, the speed of
movement usually accelerates to as much as 20 to 30 kt or
greater in the stronger upper air steering flow. However,
the system has a tendency to gradually weaken as it either
moves over colder ocean waters or cool surface air enters the
2
storm system.
See Appendix B for monthly cl imatol ogi cal tracks of
tropical cyclones in WESTPAC which at some time were of
typhoon intensity. Twenty four years of tracks were compiled
(1946-1969). The often erratic nature of movement is quite
obvious
.
2 Further discussion of acceleration of movement after
the point of recurvature is available in a recent paper by
Burroughs and Brand (1973). Riehl (1972) has also discussed
the intensity of typhoons after the point of recurvature.
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The average speed of movement of tropical cyclones moving
into the South China Sea area (Figure 1), prior to recurvature,
is approximately 10 to 11 kt. This may vary considerably,
however, depending upon the individual storm.
A point to be remembered about a tropical cyclone is that
it generates swell waves in all directions outward from its
center. These long period swell waves can often warn of an
approaching storm with heavy seas.
The sea state (combined sea and swell height) in the
vicinity of tropical cyclones varies as a function of a number
of parameters associated with the storm, including its inten-
sity, duration, size and movement. For example, a recent
study of the state of the sea around tropical cyclones in the
western North Pacific Ocean to the east of the Philippines
(Brand, e_t aj_, 1973) reveals that with an average tropical
storm (in the range of 34-63 kt) one can expect 12- ft seas or
higher within a range of 217 n mi from the storm center, while
with an intense typhoon (sustained winds greater than 100 kt)
one can expect 12-ft seas or more over a 450 n mi radius from
the center. It should be stressed, however, that these are
averages and the actual value varies from one tropical cyclone
to another.
3.2 TROPICAL CYCLONES AFFECTING HONG KONG
The "season" for tropical cyclones for Hong Kong is from
June through October, although gale force winds (average wind
speed 34-47 kt) associated with the passage of tropical
cyclones have been recorded as early as the 19th of May and
The combined sea height is defined as the square root
of the sum of the squares of "significant" sea and swell
height. Sea represents wind waves and swell consists of wind
generated waves which have advanced into regions of weaker
or calm winds. "Significant" will be defined here as the
average height of the highest one-third of the waves observed
over a specified time.
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as late as the 23rd of November. Tropical cyclones can and
do occur at any time of the year, but the storms in the "off
season" (November through May) have seldom affected the port
of Hong Kong in the past.
CI
i
matologi cal statistics indicate that five or six
tropical cyclones threaten Hong Kong each year and require the
4hoisting of the Number One local storm warning signal, with
one of these storms coming near enough to cause gale force
winds (34-47 kt) . On the average, once in every ten years
the center of a fully developed typhoon passes sufficiently
close to the harbor to provide sustained typhoon force winds
(>63 kt) and cause severe damage to shipping in the harbor
as well as local inland flooding. This does not, however,
preclude the occurrence of such a storm during any particular
year (Marine Department, Hong Kong, 1970).
If the center of a tropical cyclone passes to the south
and crosses the south China coast to the west of Hong Kong,
winds locally will be generally from the east or southeast with
gale conditions (34-47 kt) possible for several hours, pro-
viding Hong Kong comes under the direct wind circulation of
the storm. If the center of a typhoon moves northward to the
east of Hong Kong, winds will be from the north to northwest
and gales are less likely, unless the storm is intense or
passes relatively close to Hong Kong. In addition, rainfall
can be expected to be quite heavy in the former case (a typhoon
passing to the west of Hong Kong), compared to relatively
lighter amounts of precipitation when a typhoon passes to the
east of Hong Kong.
Local warning bulletins and forecasts are issued regular-
ly by the Royal Observatory Hong Kong (ROHK) whenever a local
wind warning signal is hoisted.
Definition of Storm Signal 1: "A tropical cyclone is
centered within about 400 n mi of Hong Kong and may later
cause destructive winds in the colony." All Hong Kong Storm
Signals are listed in Figure 45.
-21-
4. TROPICAL CYCLONE CLIMATOLOGY FOR HONG KONG
Figures 4 through 10 illustrate actual tracks of 62
typhoons and tropical storms (from 49 years of data) which gave
rise to gale conditions in Hong Kong. The tracks are
presented for the period June through November. The broken
track lines in Figures 4 through 10 illustrate typical tracks
of tropical cyclones not affecting Hong Kong (see Appendix B
for comparison to all tropical cyclone tracks).
Of the 62 typhoons and tropical storms considered, a
total of 53 (85%) formed over the Pacific Ocean to the east
of the Philippine Islands. Fifty of these 53 storms (94%)
crossed a line joining Basco and Manila (Figure 4). Hence,
storms crossing this line can be considered to be in a high-
probability "danger belt" for giving gale conditions at
Hong Kong. It should be noted, however, that tropical
cyclones which develop in the South China Sea may also pose
a threat to Hong Kong since these storms form at no great
distance from the port and historically have shown erratic
movement and looping tracks.
Figure 11 shows the positions of tropical cyclone centers
when first and last strong winds (>^22 kt) occurred at the
Royal Observatory Hong Kong (ROHK) on Kowloon (Figure 3).
Data from 1937-1964 (28 years) was used in obtaining Figure 11.
Similarly, Figure 12 shows the positions of tropical cyclones
when the first and last gales (winds >;34 kt) occurred at the
Royal Observatory. In both figures the "circle" ("0") sym-
bolizes the position of the tropical cyclone when strong winds
(Figure 11), or gale force winds (Figure 12), began and the
"arrow ("-*") the position when the winds ended.






Figure 4. Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; June and early July. (From
Heywood, 19 50.)
.M! 110° 120' 130° 140°
30°
Figure 5. Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; late July. (From Heywood, 19 50.)
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Figure 6. Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; early August. (From Heywood,
1950.)
Figure 7. Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; late August. (From Heywood, 19 50.)
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Figure 8. Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; early September. (From Heywood,
1950.)
Figure 9 . Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; late September. (From Heywood,
1950.)
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Figure 10. Tracks of typhoons and tropical storms associated
with gales in Hong Kong; October and November. (From
Heywood, 19 50.)
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Figure 11. Positions of tropical cyclone centers when first
and last strong winds occurred at the Royal Observatory,
Hong Kong (ROHK) . Based on data from 1937 to 1964. (From
Royal Observatory Hong Kong, unpublished.)
-27-
Figure 12. Positions of tropical cyclone centers when first
and last gale force winds occurred at the Royal Observatory,
Hong Kong (ROHK) . Based on data from 1936 to 1964. (From
Royal Observatory Hong Kong, unpublished.)
-28-
For the most part, the onset of strong winds (j>22 kt)
occurs as the tropical cyclones cross 116E moving on a
general westerly or northwesterly track. The onset of gale
force winds (^34 kt) occurs as the storms cross 115E and is
generally associated with the more northerly-tracking
tropical cyclones north of 20N.
Figure 13 shows the frequency distribution for the
number of typhoons and tropical storms which created gale
conditions in Hong Kong. These are grouped into 5-day periods
and are based on 62 years of data (1884-1941; 1946-1949).
Note the overwhelming frequency of occurrence in the months
of July, August, and September.
Figure 14 shows the average direction of approach to
Hong Kong of the 62 typhoons and tropical storms considered
previously (Figures 4 through 10) and the percentage frequency
of these approaches for each octant of the compass. Approxi-
mately 95% of these tropical cyclones approached Hong Kong
from the east through the south. The length of each line is
proportional to the number of occasions on which the cyclones
approached from a given octant.
Table 1 relates the mean distance and bearing of tropical
cyclones from Hong Kong when strong winds (_>22 kt) prevailed
at the Royal Observatory Hong Kong (ROHK) (see Figure 3) and
winds >^28 kt prevailed at Waglan Island (see Figure 15). The
mean positions of the tropical cyclone centers were computed
from 32 years of data (1936-1967).
Figure 16 is a graphical representation of Table 1.
Note that tropical cyclones passing or approaching from the
south caused strong winds at Hong Kong and Waglan Island
sooner than from any other direction of approach. In addi-
tion, the stronger winds recorded even earlier at Waglan
Island demonstrate the effect of the topography in causing
decreased winds inland at ROHK compared to the open ocean
surrounding Waglan Island. The large variation between
-29-
Figure 13. Frequency distribution of the number of typhoons
or tropical storms giving gale force conditions to Hong









SW (22%) SE (73»A))
Figure 14. Direction of approach to Hong Kong of typhoons
and tropical storms. (The length of each line is propor-
tional to the number of occasions on which typhoons and
tropical storms approached from each octant of the compass.)
(From Heywood, 1950.)
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Table 1. Mean distance of tropical cyclones when strong winds
were first recorded at the Royal Observatory and Waglan
Island (from ROHK , Unpublished).
Bearing of Center
of Storm from HK
First Stronq Winds at
Royal Observatory
(>22 kt)

















22 8 n mi
287 n mi
Waglan and ROHK for the commencement of strong winds from
tropical cyclones bearing to the east of Hong Kong addi-
tionally demonstrates the role of topography in delaying
the onset of the strong winds at ROHK.
Sea waves at Waglan Island should be of great interest
to ships considering sortie action from Hong Kong when the
harbor is being threatened by a tropical cyclone. Since
Waglan is located at the eastern approach to the harbor, but
surrounded by open ocean, a great deal of insight can be
obtained concerning rapidly increasing sea heights at the
entrance to the harbor when a tropical cyclone threatens the
port. A problem more peculiar to Hong Kong than many other
ports in WESTPAC is the rapid building of seas at the
entrance to the harbor. Adequate time must be allowed to
clear the harbor in order to avoid these high seas and gain
Currently, R. F. Apps and T. Y. Chen of the Royal
Observatory, Hong Kong, are preparing a summary of "Sea Waves
at Waglan Island." Preliminary data has been collected and
is currently being analyzed. Although the summary is in
rough draft form, significant figures have been forwarded











































































































maneuvering room in the open ocean. Figures 17 through 22
represent observed maximum wave heights off Waglan Island
during the passage of tropical cyclones in the period 1959-
1971. The values in each 2° latitude/longitude area relate
the maximum wave heights ( average maximum height of all
observations and greatest single maximum height of all
observations) recorded at Waglan Island when a tropical
cyclone was centered in that area. Tropical cyclones
affecting Hong Kong were divided into three categories:
Group 1 - Those tropical cyclones passing to the south
of Hong Kong with a west or west-northwest
movement
Group 2 - Those tropical cyclones striking the China
coast to the east of Hong Kong with a west
or west-northwest movement
Group 3 - Those tropical cyclones passing to either
side of Hong Kong with a northward movement
Additionally, each group was divided into two categories of
intensity of the tropical cyclones:
Category 1 (more intense tropical cyclones) -
all typhoons and severe tropical storms
Category 2 (less intense tropical cyclones) -
all tropical storms and tropical depressions
Significant wave height (H or H-, /3 ) which represents
the average of the highest 1/3 of the observed waves can be
MAX
obtained approximately from the relationship: H = ^
—
gy,
where H MAX is the average maximum wave height (the bottom
number in each box in Figures 17 through 22) (U. S. Naval
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Figures 17 through 22 provide a means for determining the
maximum wave heights to be anticipated and when to expect
these heights at the approach to the harbor. Determining
these heights from the figures requires only the tropical
cyclone forecast track and position relative to Hong Kong
(Group 1, 2, or 3) and the relative intensity of the storm
(Category 1 or 2)
.
There are significantly different local effects on the
harbor for tropical cyclone centers passing to the west of
Hong Kong as opposed to those centers passing to the east.
In order to determine the probability of a tropical cyclone
in the Philippine Sea or South China Sea affecting Hong Kong
and its surrounding region at some future time, 87 years of
tropical cyclones were examined.
Figures 23 through 29 represent a statistical summary of
the 87 years (1884-1970) of tropical cyclone tracks (Chin,
1972). The tracks were compiled into monthly summaries (May-
November) by tallying the number of tropical cyclones that
passed through each 3° latitude/longitude area for each month
4
over the 87-year period. This tally number for the month is
printed at the top of each area (defined as "N"). To analyze
the tracks which came close to Hong Kong, a line tangent to
the China coast, through Hong Kong, was selected (oriented
east-northeast to west-southwest). A radius of 3° latitude
(180 n mi) was chosen for the semicircle as is shown in
Figures 23 through 29. The percentage of tropical cyclones
(defined as "RAD") that passed through the box and also
passed within the 180 n mi semicircle is given at the bottom
Since the original tracks by Chin (1972) were compiled
for 5-day periods, exact calendar months could not be obtained
from the data; however, each month was adjusted as close to
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of that 3°x3° area. To further assess the proximity of the
tracks relative to Hong Kong, "R-j"











Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the box and and also crossed the line to
the east-northeast of Hong Kong within a distance
of 60 n mi (1° latitude)
Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the box and also crossed the line to the
east-northeast of Hong Kong within a distance of
180 n mi (3° latitude)
Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the box and also crossed the line to the
west-southwest of Hong Kong within a distance of
60 n mi (1° latitude)
Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the box and also crossed the line to the
west-southwest of Hong Kong within a distance of
180 n mi (3° latitude) 5
As an example, in Figure 25 for the month of July, the
square over the Luzon area of the northernmost Philippine
Islands had 40 tracks of tropical cyclones pass through it in
the 87 years of data. Of those 40 tracks, 45% passed within
the 180 n mi semicircle from Hong Kong. Fifteen percent of
the 40 tracks passed within 60 n mi to the east-northeast of
Hong Kong (across the line) and 17% passed within 180 n mi to
the east-northeast. Similarly, in the same example, 12% of
The R
3
value (%) plus the L 3 value (%) will not always
equal the percentage of all tropical cyclones to enter the
semicircle, 180 n mi since some of the cyclones passed
through the area of the semicircle, but failed to cross the
1 i ne.
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the tracks passed within 60 n mi to the west-southwest of
Hong Kong (across the line) and 20% passed within 180 n mi to
the west-southwest.
For easier evaluation, Figures 30 through 36 have been
analyzed with respect to the percentage of tropical cyclones
which have passed within the 180 n mi semicircle (the bottom
value in each square from Figures 23 through 29). In addi-
tion, the approximate time required for the cyclone to cross
the east-northeast/west-southwest line through Hong Kong is
shown, based on typical speeds of movement of from 8 to 12 kt
(the faster the speed, the sooner the time of crossing).
For example, Figure 35 shows, for the month of October,
that of all the tropical cyclones over the 87 years of data
that crossed over the Northern Luzon area of the Philippine
Islands, approximately 50% entered the semicircle 180 n mi
from Hong Kong. Additionally, those tropical cyclones which
crossed the base of the semicircle (east-northeast/west-
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5. CHARACTERISTICS OF HONG KONG HARBOR
5.1 INFLUENCE OF THE TOPOGRAPHY
Figure 37 shows the general east-west orientation of the
ranges of hills on both Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. This
orientation tends to somewhat channel the winds from approach-
ing tropical cyclones to a general east-west component, even
though the circulation of the storm may suggest a more
northerly or southerly wind. Figure 37 also shows the three
basic harbor anchorage areas: Western Anchorage, Middle
Harbor, and Eastern Anchorage and Junk Bay.
General notes on the geography of the south China coast
and Hong Kong, and its effect on the wind field of tropical
cyclones have been obtained from LCDR A. M. Morrice, Royal
Navy, Base Meteorological Officer, Office of the Commodore-in-
Charge, Hong Kong. Briefly, Morrice discusses the three
anchorage areas (Figure 37) and describes general conditions
in each area as a direct result of the passage of a tropical
cyclone from various directions relative to Hong Kong
(Morrice, 1973a):
1 . General Geography
The south China coast lies east-northeast to
west-southwest from the Taiwan Strait to the Luichow
Peninsula. It forms a rugged and well-indented
coastline with a multitude of small islands. In
adverse weather conditions it is a dangerous shore-
line. Inland, major mountain ranges run approxi-
mately east-west .
2. Hong Kong (refer to Figure 37)
The main topographical features of Hong Kong
are two ranges of hills. Over the New Territories
in the norths a well marked ridge runs from east to
west from Kowloon Peak to Tai Mo Shan and Castle
Peak. Approximately 8 miles south of this is
another ridge, again orientated east-west 3 con-
sisting of Hong Kong Island itself and Lantau
Island, broken by a gap of about 6 n mi.
-58-
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To simplify this discussion the harbor wilt





(Hi) Eastern Anchorage and Junk Bay.
The effects of tropical cyclones at various bearings
and distances will be discussed. A direct hit or
very close pass will also be considered.
a) Tropical cyclone passing to the SE of
Hong Kong
The vast majority of tropical cyclones
approach Hong Kong from the southeast
.
The resultant winds are from the north,
and because of the rugged terrain to
the north 3 the winds experienced locally
are less severe than might otherwise be
expected. Any tropical cyclone running
inland over SO n mi east of Hong Kong is
likely to have little effect on the harbor.
However, as the circulation moves north
and weakens , there is often an increase
of wind strength from the southwest. This
will affect Western Anchorage in particular,
which has a long fetch towards the south,
and may therefore experience destructive
seas
.
b) Tropical cyclone passing S to SW of Hong
Kong
As the bearing changes from S to SSW the
local winds will veer to the east. Because
of the east-west orientation of the hills,
there is a well marked tendency for the
winds to remain easterly in Middle Harbor
and Western Anchorage even as the bearing
of the tropical cyclone becomes SW or even
SSW (provided the center is over about
150 n mi from Hong Kong). In Junk Bay the
wind will probably change suddenly to
southeasterly and increase with a rapid
build-up of wave height under these
conditions. In such a situation all
sections of the harbor will be exposed and
dangerous .
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c) Tropical cyclone moving north passing
to the west of Hong Kong
Provided the landfall is between 50 and
150 n mi west of Hong Kong t winds are
unlikely to veer beyond southeasterly 3 and
so Western Anchorage and Middle Harbor will
be relatively sheltered, while Eastern
Anchorage and Junk Bay would become more
exposed. However 3 once the circulation
has hit land winds may become south or
southwesterly > as in paragraph (a) 3 with
a sudden increase in Western Anchorage
.
d) Direct Hit or Close Pass
Any tropical cyclone passing within 25 n mi
to the east and 50 n mi to the west of
Hong Kong will have serious effect on all
areas of the harbor. Storm surge can cause
dangerous rises in sea level. Sea walls
and piers have been known to be awash when
the surge coincided with a high tide.
Within the harbor the sea becomes very
confused with short steep waves. Should
the wind go south or southwest 3 dangerous
conditions prevail in Western Anchorage
.
Obviously 3 the closer the center passes to
Hong Kong 3 the greater is the effect on
the harbor. Unfortunately 3 there is no
particular area of the harbor which could
be considered as favorably situated under
such conditions.
5.2 STORM SURGE IN THE HARBOR
The natural harbor of Hong Kong, like any other harbor,
is subject to "storm surge" effects as the tropical cyclone
approaches landfall. Storm surges can be defined as the
difference between the observed water level during the storm
and that which would have occurred at the same time and place
in the absence of the storm (Cheng, 1967). In other words,
a storm surge implies a "piling up" of excess water in the
harbor due to:
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a. the reduction of surface pressure created by the
cyclone;
b. wave run-up onto the beaches as a result of winds
and seas (dependent upon the shore line character-
istics; and
c. accompanying torrential rains and runoff into the
harbor (Watts, 1959). 1
Tropical cyclones which yielded storm surges in Hong Kong
harbor greater than two feet for the years 1936-1971 are
presented in Table 2. The higher values, near 6 feet, resulted
from fast-moving tropical cyclones with accompanying torrential
rains and a storm surge maximum that corresponded to the time
of the astronomical high tide. Storm surges, coinciding with
high tide, can cause a serious rise in the water level
resulting in the sea walls and piers becoming awash (Morrice,
1973a).
"Seiche" effects, or the natural period of oscillation
between the harbor and incoming swell wave, that can produce
a rapid rise and fall of the water level does not appear to be
a significant problem in the open-ended harbor of Hong Kong.
Additionally, since the harbor is open to both the east and
west, it acts to dissipate, to some extent, the seiche and
storm surge amplitude (Watts, 1959).
For a more detailed description of storm surge forecast
techniques, the reader is referred to Nickerson, 1971.
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Table 2. Storm surges in Hong Kong harbor (from ROHK,
unpublished)
.
STORM SURGE IN HONG
YEAR MONTH TROPICAL CYCLONE KONG HARBOR (in feet)
1936 AUG 6.3
1937 SEP > 6
1962 SEP WANDA 5.8
1954 AUG IDA 5.4
1964 SEP RUBY 4.9
1949 SEP 4.9
1957 SEP GLORIA 4.4
1964 AUG IDA 4.3
1954 NOV PAMELA 3.8
1968 AUG SHIRLEY 3.6
1960 JUN MARY 3.6
1965 JUL FREDA 3.3
1971 JUL LUCY 3.2
1964 MAY VIOLA 3.1
1971 JUN FREDA 2.8
1963 SEP FAYE 2.8
1971 OCT ELAINE 2.6
1957 JUL WENDY 2.5
1967 AUG KATE 2.4
1964 SEP BILLIE 2.4
1956 AUG CHARLOTTE 2.4
1951 AUG 2.4
1969 JUL VIOLA 2.3
1960 OCT KIT 2.3
1955 SEP KATE 2.3
1954 NOV RUBY 2.2
1958 MAY 2.2
1953 SEP SUSAN 2.1
1956 OCT JEAN 2.1
1971 AUG ROSE 2.1
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6. CASE STUDIES
6.1 TYPHOON ROSE (Aug 10-17, 1971)
Figure 38 is the track followed by Typhoon ROSE, giving
6-hour best track positions, speeds of movement, and intensi-
ties (U. S. FWC/JTWC, 1971). A brief discussion obtained from
the Royal Observatory, Hong Kong follows:
In spite of its relatively small size, Typhoon
'Rose' was probably one of the most intense and
violent typhoons that have affected Hong Kong.
Maximum wind speeds were only slightly lower than in
Typhoon 'Ruby' (1964) and Typhoon 'Wanda' (1962) and
they occurred during the night whereas both 'Ruby '
and 'Wanda' passed in daylight. Like other tropical
cyclones that approached from the south, such as
Typhoon 'Mary ' in 1960, 'Rose ' caused very heavy
rainfall . The strongest winds were from the east-
southeast compared with 'Wanda' when the strongest
winds were from the north.
On August 10, 'Rose' developed as a tropical
depression about 110 n mi west of Guam and soon
intensified to a typhoon. It moved west-northwestwards
at 11 knots at first but then followed a westerly
track at about 14 knots for the next three days.
During the period August 11-12, the reported maximum
winds within the circulation of 'Rose' fluctuated
between storm and hurricane force. However, it
remained as a typhoon from August 13 onwards . The
center of Typhoon 'Rose ' started to cross north Luzon
early in the morning of August 14 and entered the South
China Sea later in the day.
In Hong Kong, the Standby Signal, No. 1, was
hoisted at 5 p.m. on August 14, when 'Rose' was centered
about 400 n mi southeast of the Colony, and was moving
west-northwest at about 10 knots.
On August 15, 'Rose' slowed down to about 7 knots
as it turned to a northwesterly course. Positions of
the typhoon located by reconnaissance aircraft formed a
very erratic track and the eye diameter fluctuated
between 13 and 50 n mi. However , eight successive
reports did show almost continuous intensification




988 mb at 1:25 p.m. on August 14 to 957 mb at midnight
on August 15-16. At 7 p.m. on August 15, a reconnais-
sance aircraft reported a maximum surface wind of ISO
knots (estimated to be equivalent to a 10-minute mean
wind of 115 knots) near the center of 'Rose'. By
the late afternoon, it was possible to identify
the eye of Typhoon 'Rose ' on the Observatory '
s
radar displays . The radar presentation revealed
that the rainbands of Typhoon 'Rose' were well
organized but only covered an area of about
100 n mi in diameter . The eye was well defined
most of the time and was about 20 n mi in diameter.
It appeared that 'Rose' was a compact but well
developed typhoon.
On August 16 3 the typhoon began to move on a
northerly course at about 7 knots towards Hong Kong
and the Strong Wind Signal, No. 3, was hoisted at
5:05 a.m. when it was about 150 n mi away to the
south. A statement was issued by the Royal
Observatory to warn people that because of the
relatively small size of Typhoon "Rose' winds might
increase very rapidly over the Colony. The North-
east Gale or Storm Signal, No. 7 (8 NE),-1- was hoisted
at 9:50 a.m. as Typhoon 'Rose' continued to approach
the Colony. Satellite pictures received at the
Royal Observatory during the morning showed that the
circulation of 'Rose' was still very well-orgnanized
and that clouds covered an area of about 360 n mi
in diameter
.
At about 10 a.m. a ship, S. S. Nuddea, reported
that she was experiencing 90 to 110 knot winds some
10 n mi east-northeast of the typhoon center. Later
in the afternoon she sent another report, estimating
the central pressure to be 950 mb . At about the same
time, another ship within 7 n mi of the center
recorded a minimum pressure of 952 mb . At 12:25 p.m.
when the eye was about 100 n mi away, the Southeast
Gale or Storm Signal, No. 8 (8 SE), was hoisted to
replace No. 7 (8NE) to warn a change in the direction
of the gales.
The Signal numbers: 5, 6, 7, and 8 have recently
been revised (effective 1 Jan 73) to: 8NW, 8SW, 8NE, and
8SE, respectively. See Figure 45 for Hong Kong storm signals
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During the morning on August 16, surface winds
over the Colony were mainly fresh from the northeast
quarter. The wind speed increased gradually in the
afternoon and gales were experienced in outlying
islands by the early evening . Sustained winds of
gale force were reported by all local stations soon
after dark and the wind direction turned to east and
southeast
,
The Increasing Gale or Storm Signal, No. 9,
was hoisted at 9:10 p.m. on August 16 when 'Rose'
was about 50 n mi south-southwest of the Royal
Observatory and was replaced by the Hurricane Signal,
No. 10, at 10:50 p.m. as the eye of the typhoon
continued to move northwards at 10 knots. During
the night of August 16-17, winds of hurricane force
were experienced in many places, particularly over
the western part of the Colony. The edge of the
eye of Typhoon 'Rose ' passed close to the west of
Cheung Chau at about 1:52 a.m. on August 17. The
surface wind at Cheung Chau decreased from 66 to
below 25 knots in 15 minutes and the sea level
pressure fell to 963.2 mb . At about the same time
a minimum pressure of 982. 8 mb was recorded at the
Royal Observatory . The eye crossed Lantau Island,
and at Tai winds fell almost calm around 2:20 a.m.
and then returned to hurricane force at 2:47 a.m.
The center then passed across Deep Bay and moved
away from the Colony north-northwestwards towards
Canton.
As the typhoon began to weaken overland. No. 10
was replaced by the Southwest Gale or Storm Signal,
No. 6 (8 SW), at 4:40 a.m. This was followed by
the Strong Wind Signal, No. 3, at 9:15 a.m. All
signals were lowered at noon on August 17.
'Rose ' weakened to a tropical storm at about
noon on August 17 and dissipated near Canton about
110 miles north-northwest of the Colony. Fresh
southerly winds prevailed over the Colony for several
hours in the early afternoon.
During the passage of 'Rose', there were 6 hours
of gales at the Royal Observatory , while hurricane
force winds were recorded for 1 hour at the Hong
Kong International Airport, 2 hours at Cape
Collinson and Waglan Island, 3 hours at Cheung Chau,
and 4 hours at Tate ' s Cairn. The maximum gusts
recorded were 102 knots at Waglan Island, 103 knots
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at Cape Collinson } 104 knots at Cheung Chau, 114
knots at the northwest end and 106 knots at the
southeast end of Hong Kong International Airport,
120 knots at Tate's Cairn, and 121 knots at the
Boy at Observatory . At the top of Tai Mo Shan, a
maximum gust of 150 knots was recorded at 1:43 a.m.
just before the anemometer was broken at 2:11 a.m.
The weather in Hong Kong was cloudy with
scattered showers on the morning of August 16, but
the showers became frequent and squally during the
day and morning of August 17 and a total of 167.5 mm
(6.6") of rainfall was recorded at the Royal
Observatory in the three hours between 1:00 a.m.
and 4:00 a.m. Brilliant flashes of lightning were
also observed at this time but because of the noise
caused by the wind no thunder could be heard at the
observing stations . During the heavy rain on August
17 the trace of the 'Jardi' rate-of-rainfall recorder
at Tate 's Cairn rose to above the upper limit of the
chart and the maximum instantaneous rate which
occurred around 8:30 a.m. was estimated to be 513 mm/hour
(20.2 in/hour). The weather improved rapidly during
the afternoon of August 17 and no rainfall was recorded
after 5 p.m.
An unusual phenomenon observed was the development
of sea fog at Waglan Island, Cheung Chau and Cape
Collinson during the morning of August 18. This was
probably caused by a lowering of the sea surface
temperature by Typhoon 'Rose'. Fog is rare in Hong
Kong in August.
The following daily amounts of rainfalls were




August 16 52.8 mm (2.1 in)
August 17 288.1 mm (11.3 in)
The daily total rainfall of 288.1 mm (11.3 in) on
August 17 is the highest value ever recorded in one
calendar day in August in Hong Kong.
The times and heights of the highest tides and
maximum storm surges recorded at the various locations
in the Colony during Typhoon 'Rose' were as follows:
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Highest Tide Maximum Storm Surge
Location Above Chart Datum Above Predicted Level
Height Date Time Height Date Time
North Point
( see Fig. 3)
2.56 m Aug. 17
(8.40 ft)
2:20 a.m. 0.64 m
(2.10 ft)
Aug. 17 2:20 a.m.
Tai Po Kau
(see Fig. 2)
3.00 m Aug. 17
(9.84 ft)
3:25 a.m. 0.98 m
(3.22 ft)




2.98 m Aug. 17
(9. 7 ft)
1:05 a.m. 1.23 m
(4.04 ft)
Aug. 17 1:05 a.m.
Wind-generated waves of about 9.5 metres
(31.2 ft) were registered by the electronic wave-
recorder near Waglan Island at noon on August 16
just before the submerged cable lead was broken.
However 3 waves estimated to be 14 metres (46 ft)
high were observed by H.M.S. Argonaut about 70 n mi
north of the typhoon during the afternoon on the
same day.
Tragically , 'Hose ' was the worst typhoon for
fatalities and heavy damage on property in Hong Kong
since Typhoon 'Wanda' in 1962 . In general , heavier
damage was reported in the western than in the
eastern side of the Colony. According to preliminary
reports, 74 people were killed and a further 50
are missing and presumed dead. A total of 5,644
people from 1,032 families was made homeless and
653 huts were destroyed. 286 persons were injured
of whom 90 had to be hospitalized. 26 ocean-going
vessels went aground and 2 were sunk. 300 small
craft, including 100 pleasure craft were sunk or
damaged. Six of the 14 hydrofoils on the Hong Kong-
Macau run were put out of action and a total of 6
Hong Kong & Yaumati ferries went aground while
taking shelter in Kowloon Bay.
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The USS REGULUS (AF-57) was one of the 26 ocean-going
vessels that ran aground as a direct result of the passage of
Typhoon ROSE. Photographs of the damage sustained by the
REGULUS when she ran aground on Kau Yi Chau Island (see
Figure 2) after dragging anchor for over a mile in the vicinity
of the Western Anchorage area, appear in Figures 39 and 40.
The REGULUS steamed to the anchor at 1 to 8.8 kt which was not
sufficient to hold its position in the 65 kt sustained winds
with gusts in excess of 100 kt. This tragedy represented an
$8- $10 million dollar loss to the U. S. Navy and serves to
stress the importance of never underestimating the destructive
capability of a typhoon.
The REGULUS was not the only ship tragedy during the
passage of ROSE, as illustrated by the list of vessel casual-
ties (structural damage, aground, or sunk) in Table 3 and
the graphic display of ships aground in Figure 41.
6.2 TYPHOON WANDA (Aug 27-Sept 2, 1962)
Figure 42 is the track followed by Typhoon WANDA, giving
6-hour best track positions, speeds of movement, and intensi-
ties (U. S. FWC/JTWC Guam, 1962). A brief summary of Typhoon
WANDA is now presented as was given by the Royal Observatory,
Hong Kong (Peterson and Cheng, 1966):
"WANDA" formed on August 27 as a tropical
depression over the Pacific about 1300 n mi to the
east-southeast of Hong Kong. Moving west-northwest
towards the Luzon Strait at fifteen knots it
gradually intensified and by the next day was a
severe tropical storm. On August 29 a U.S.A.F.
reconnaissance aircraft flew into the eye of the
storm and reported that the wind strength had
reached hurricane force. By this time the circu-
lation of the typhoon covered a wide area about
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Another aircraft reconnaissance on August 30
indicated that further intensification had occurred
and 80 knot winds were reported near the center.
It continued to move towards Hong Kong and by the
evening it was centered 400 n mi east- southeast of
the Colony 3 over the southern part of the Luzon
Strait. No. 1 Local Storm Signal was hoisted at
7:45 p.m.
Up to this time the winds over the Colony had
been generally light or moderate but early the next
morning they set in from the north and showed signs
of freshening . The No. 3 Local Storm Signal was
hoisted at 4:10 p.m. on August 31.
The first rain came with a squall of north-
northwest winds which moved west across the Colony
during the early evening. By 9 p.m. typhoon "WANDA"
was centered about 155 n mi east- southeast of the
Colony and was moving west or west-northwest at
10 knots. Although no strong winds had yet been
reported it became certain that "WANDA" would pass
close to the Colony the next day and No. 7 (8 NE)
signal was hoisted at 10:50 p.m. The wind speed
reached gale force with gusts to 48 knots at Waglan
Island at 2:00 a.m. on September 1 when "WANDA" was
centered about 105 n mi away.
At 4:15 a. m. No. 9 Local Storm Signal was
hoisted to indicate that the gales were expected
to increase . By this time winds over the harbor
were averaging about 30 knots from the north-
northwest but Waglan Island was reporting 40 knots
with gusts to 57 knots.
No. 10 Local Storm Signal was hoisted at
6:15 a.m. on September 1 when "WANDA" was centered
some 50 n mi away and moving directly towards the
Colony. As the approach coincided with high tide 3
a warning was issued at 6:30 a.m. stating .that the
water would rise 6 feet above normal high tide in
the harbor and much higher in Tolo Harbor with
flooding over low-lying land.
By 9 a.m. Typhoon "WANDA" was centered over
the eastern waters of the Colony and hurricane
force winds were blowing over most of Hong Kong.
Gusts of 116 knots were reported from Waglan Island
and 154 knots from Tate's Cairn. The anemogram
from the Royal Observatory showed that the 10
minute mean wind reached typhoon force at about
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9:20 a.m. and rose to a maximum of about 7 8 knots
at about 9:30 a.m. It decreased slightly as the
eye passed and then increased again to about 74
knots at 10:00 a.m. At about 9:30 a.m. a maximum
gust of 140 knots was recorded at the Royal
Observatory as the typhoon center was passing
south of Waglan Island. After making corrections
for the reduced density of the air and the
calibration of the anemometer the maximum gust
at the Royal Observatory was 145 knots (167 m.p.h.)
and at Tate's Cairn 164 knots (189 m.p.h.). The
center of Typhoon "WANDA" passed about 10 n mi
south of the Royal Observatory at 9:50 a.m. still
moving west-northwest at 11 knots. Tides in
Tolo Harbor rose about 10 feet above the normal
high tide or 17 feet above chart datum, while the
crests of wind-driven waves at Tai Po Kau reached
about 23 feet above chart datum. Altogether nearly
12 inches of rainfall were recorded at the Royal
Observatory . At 11:30 a.m. the eye of "WANDA"
passed very close to Cheung Chau and it was almost
calm there for a while. With the typhoon passing
close to the south there was a rapid veering of
winds to southeast over the whole Colony and
although there was a temporary lull in many places
the wind strength increased again. At noon gusts
of 82 knots were still being reported from Waglan
Island and 80 knot gusts were registered at the
Royal Observatory at 12:30 p.m. By this time the
typhoon was centered close to Lantau and was moving
away to the west at 12 knots. No. 10 signal was
replaced by No. 6 (8 SW ) at 2:15 p.m. to indicate
that the wind might veer to the southwest . Although
gales were still blowing at Waglan Island and Cheung
Chau up to 6 p.m. the wind over the harbor area had
dropped below gale force by this time.
No. 3 signal replaced No. 6 (8 SW) Local Storm
Signal at 7:05 p.m. and 3 as strong winds persisted,
it could not be lowered until 12:45 a.m. on September
2 when all danger had passed. The typhoon moved
inland over Kwangtung and weakened rapidly during
the morning
.
A summary of wind observations taken while Typhoon WANDA
moved inland near the local area is shown in Table 4, recorded
both at the Royal Observatory (ROHK) and on Waglan Island
outside the approach to the harbor. Note, in general, the
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Mi dni ght 993.2 340 17 42 1.3 330 29 48
1 991.7 330 20 42 Trace 330 36 49
2 988.8 330 21 46 Trace 330 40 54
3 985.8 340 29 61 1 .4 330 44 68
4 983.0 330 31 60 0.5 330 45 65
5 980.5 340 29 58 2.8 340 50 76
6 977.7 320 36 71 4.1 330 59 78
7 970.7 320 45 86 14.8 330 73 111
8 963.2 360 54 113 55.1 320 63 117
9 958.2 010 68 140 27.8 080 27 47
10 955.1 050 48 96 3.2 150 51 72
11 964.0 130 40 81 2.6 160 61 82
12 974.3 160 36 80 1 .3 160 54 78
13 980.8 180 33 77 2.6 160 49 63
14 984.3 170 35 78 4.7 160 45 63
15 986.2 170 30 71 1 .6 160 44 60
16 988.0 180 23 55 2.8 160 39 53
17 989.6 180 23 45 5.6 150 35 48
18 990.9 180 19 43 1 .9 150 31 44
19 992. 1 180 20 49 9.9 140 31 45
20 992.8 180 16 39 18.0 130 28 42
21 994.3 170 16 38 18.3 130 30 42
22 995.1 170 16 35 7.2 130 30 40
23 995.9 180 15 39 7.0 130 27 38
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relatively lower mean wind speeds throughout the period at the
Royal Observatory compared to Waglan Island as a result of the
protection afforded by the ranges of hills referred to under
topography (paragraph 5.1).
Damage and casualties were widespread throughout the
Colony with the passage of Typhoon WANDA. One hundred and
thirty people were killed and 53 were reported m'issing.
Approximately 72,000 people were registered as being homeless.
Of a total of 20,287 small craft in Colony waters, 726 were
wrecked, 571 were sunk and 756 damaged. Of a total of 132
ocean-going ships, 24 were beached and 12 were involved in
collisions. Figure 43 shows the SS CRONULLA (2,330 tons)
capsized after striking the sea wall and jetty at North Point
(Figure 3) (Peterson and Cheng, 1966).
6.3 COMPARISON OF TYPHOON ROSE AND TYPHOON WANDA
Although both storms caused severe damage to the Hong Kong
area and shipping in the harbor, they had differing character-
istics. Typhoon ROSE approached Hong Kong from the south at
a relatively slow 7-8 kt, whereas Typhoon WANDA came from the
southeast with a prior movement of 12-13 kt. The maximum
storm surge recorded in Hong Kong harbor for Typhoon ROSE was
2.1 ft compared to 5.8 ft with Typhoon WANDA (see Table 2).
Approaching Hong Kong, Typhoon ROSE possessed winds of greater
intensity at its center (near 115 knots sustained) while
Typhoon WANDA maintained a lesser 90 kt sustained wind (see
Figures 38 and 42). The size of circulation of Typhoon ROSE,
was small compared to Typhoon WANDA which had an extremely
large circulation pattern. Both storms did, however, pass
within 10 n mi of the Colony creating a path of destruction
as they moved across the China coast and then rapidly dissi-
pated over land.
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Figure 43. S. S. CRONULLA, 2,330 tons, capsized after strik-
ing the sea wall and jetty at North Point with the passage
of Typhoon WANDA. (From Peterson and Cheng, 1966.)
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7. PREPARATION FOR HEAVY WEATHER
7.1 TROPICAL CYCLONE WARNINGS
Through aircraft reconnaissance and satellite observa-
tions modern techniques for locating tropical cyclones and
monitoring their progress have become quite sophisticated com-
pared to early mariner days. Nevertheless, the present state
of meteorological knowledge does not permit a perfect prediction
of storm movements. As stated previously, many variables exist
which can alter the path of a typhoon, hence, every typhoon
should be treated with the utmost respect.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201-(YR), Annex W, describes the
techniques to be used when plotting the Fleet Weather Central/
Joint Typhoon Warning Center (FWC/JTWC) typhoon warning track
positions. The average 24-hour forecast error of 135 n mi
should always be incorporated when plotting the 24-hr fore-
cast position in order to expand the radius of 30 kt winds,
given in the warning, by the average forecast error. Figure
44 demonstrates this procedure and utilizes the 135 n mi average
24-hr forecast position error in obtaining the "danger area."
With the advent of new techniques, better computer systems,
and experienced personnel, this average error is gradually
being reduced by FWC/JTWC, Guam to near 100 n mi. However,
the 135 n mi error should still be used in compliance with
COMSEVENTHFLT 0P0RDS. Similarly, the 48-and 72-hr forecasted
positions given in the FWC/JTWC warning provide a planning
forecast, but must also be adjusted to consider a 275 n mi
and 400 n mi average forecast error, respectively. When
interpreting these average 24-, 48-, and 72-hr forecast
errors, it should be remembered that these values are indeed
averages. About half of the predictions must have had errors
greater than this distance with extreme errors more than
three times larger than the average (Somervell and Jarrell,







































































hours should be standard procedure, as tracks are constantly
updated and revised, and on occasion, radically changed
(e.g., due to recurvature of the tropical cyclone).
ROHK advisories are also available to all ships in port
at Hong Kong via the harbor net circuits. As the tropical
cyclone nears Hong Kong, local radar can yield an excellent
fix of the center position if the cyclone is well defined.
Storm signals displayed in the harbor are as shown in
Figure 45.
Once the decision has been made either to remain in port
or to sortie and evade, it is the responsibility of the Senior
Officer Present Afloat (SOPA) to advise all concerned as to
his intended action in accordance with applicable OPORDS/
INSTRUCTIONS. The message format is given in COMSEVENTHFLT
OPORD 201-(YR), Annex W, Tab D to Appendix II.
7.2 EVASION
The key to a safe evasion must lie in the awareness that
a threat to the harbor exists. Tropical cyclones which cross
the northern portion of the Philippines into the South China
Sea and finally strike the China coast have, in the past, had
a relatively high probability (37-56% throughout the typhoon
season, from Figures 23 through 29) of passing within the
180-n mi, over-ocean semicircle from Hong Kong. Sorties from
Hong Kong must be made early in order to gain maneuvering room
in the open ocean. Within 24 hours after a tropical cyclone
crosses the Philippine Islands, although still a great distance
from Hong Kong, swells can be generated that can severely
ROHK advisories may use the Beaufort wind force scale.














A tropical cyclone 1s
centered within 400 n
mi which may later cause
strong wind, gale, storm
or typhoon force winds
in the Hong Kong area.
A strong wind (average
wind speed 22-33 kt) is
expected.
8NW. Gale or storm force winds
(average wind speed 34-








Gale or storm force winds
are expected from the SW
quadrant.
Gale or storm force winds
are expected from the NE
quadrant.
Gale or storm force winds







Typhoon force winds (over
63 kt) are expected from
any direction.
NOTE: O = white light O = green light = red light (The above
signals should not be confused with the strong monsoon black ball,
night signal white, green, white)
Figure 45. Hong Kong storm signals
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hamper a ship's speed-of-advance (Heywood, 1950). In the
case study of Typhoon ROSE, even with the center of the storm
100 n mi south of Hong Kong, maximum seas in excess of 30 ft
were observed by a wave recorder at Waglan Island (at the
eastern approach to the harbor). These seas were measured
approximately 14 hours before Typhoon ROSE struck the China
coast just outside the harbor! Consequently, sortie action
even 14 hours prior to the closest point of approach (CPA) to
Hong Kong of Typhoon ROSE, with 30-ft seas as the entrance
to the harbor, would have been very hazardous to say the
1 east.
Decisive action must be taken early! Recalling all hands
or enough critical personnel to sortie and clear the harbor
is an extremely important part of getting out of Hong Kong
harbor in time to evade. The heavy swells produced at the
entrance to the harbor as a result of a typhoon crossing into
the South China Sea can make a late sortie extremely dangerous.
The Royal Navy utilizes the following criteria for berth-
ing and evasion as described by LCDR Morrice, Royal Navy,
Base Meteorological Officer, Office of the Commodore-in-Charge
,




The Royal Navy does not consider Hong Kong
a suitable haven under typhoon conditions . The
normal Naval policy is for warships of frigate
displacement and above to put to sea in suffi-
cient time for adequate evasion to be possible.
Smaller units (patrol craft and coastal mine-




It is a matter of policy that no HM Ship
remains alongside . The quay walls in the Naval
Basin are considered too low because of the pos-
sibility of storm surge reinforcing high tides.
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Experience has shown that the sea in Victoria
Harbour becomes very confused with short steep
waves. There is photographic evidence that the
quay walls can be awash under typhoon conditions
.
Serious bumping with major damage and capsize
resulting are considered very real consequences
of staying alongside .
3. Naval Buoys (See Figure 3)
Numbers 1 and 2 Naval buoys are up to the
standard for typhoon moorings and may be occu-
pied at the discretion of Commodore Hong Kong
by ships up to 600 ' in length; however, they
invariably have to be vacated for use by the
resident RN Patrol Craft. Numbers 3 and 4 buoys
are only suitable for Patrol Craft or ships of
CMS (coastal minesweeper) size in Typhoon
conditions
.
4. Government Buoys (See Figure 3)
Buoy B28 is normally used as a Patrol Craft
typhoon mooring and as such may have to be vacated
at an early stage. Buoys Al > A2 and A3 are not
typhoon moorings . Buoys A4-A40 3 A43 and A44
are classed as special typhoon moorings for ships
up to 600' in length. Buoys B5-B9, Bll t B13-B22,
B25 3 and B26 are classed as special typhoon
moorings for ships up to 370' in length. All these
buoys may be required by the Director of Marine
who may order them to be vacated at any time.
Their classification is subject to alteration at
short notice.
5. Anchorages (See Figure 3)
Despite the quality of the bottom, anchoring
in either Eastern or Western Anchorages is
considered undesirable. In every major typhoon
since the war a considerable number of ships
have broken adrift from moorings and anchorages
;
these drifting hulks then present a deadly threat
to ships in their path. The tragic loss of
nearly 80 lives on the SS FATSAN in Typhoon
ROSE (August 1971) was attributed to some extent
to collisions with ships which had broken




The nature of the coastline makes impera-
tive an early departure if a real threat is in
the offing. The effect of sailing on morale,
always high in our considerations , must take
second place under these conditions to the
potential loss of 3 or severe damage to,
operational units. during the period May-
October , all HM ships in Hong Kong not under
maintenance are required to be at 4 hours
notice for sea and must be able to recall
sufficient duty personnel to take the ship
to sea within that time limit.
7 Maintenance
Ships under maintenance present a special
problem, but here again the basic approach is
the same. Repairs have to be boxed up to allow
the ships to proceed to sea. There are only
limited docking facilities available 3 and being
commercial there is no guarantee that space will
be available "on the day." In extremis, large
ships have been towed to buoys and secured there




The overall policy is to "retain flexi-
bility." This often entails decisions at an
early stage when the magnitude of the threat is
unknown and difficult to predict. However, ade-
quate planning at this time can prevent the
disastrous consequence of being unable to react
in the way one would have wished to at a later
stage. It is considered essential to take
precautions and be prepared early, and then stand
down should the threat diminish.
Normal Sequence of Events with a Slow Build UP
9 See Figure 46
The times given are for an 8-12 kt movement
.
10. A tropical cyclone in area A (Figure 46)
(or even a potential development area in A) with
a meteorological situation which indicates a





a. The material state of all ships will be
reviewed.
b. Those fully operational will be warned
that a situation may develop in 2-4 days which
oould necessitate sailing. This will be passed
to liberty men with particular reference to any
whose families have come to join them in Hong
Kong
.
c. Ships under maintenance will be considered
more carefully . Any at 48 hours notice will
require a decision 3 even at this early stage 3
if flexibility of action is not to be lost
later
.
11. Tropical cyclone moves into area B . (See Figure 46)
Should the meteorological situation still
indicate a threat to Hong Kong 3 then ships under
maintenance at 24 hours notice require a decision
at this stage. Fully operational ships will start
planning what course of action they will take
should sailing be ordered. This aspect will be
considered in more detail in a later section.
12. Tropical cyclone entering area C. (See Figure 46)
All the plans made during the previous
stages now go into effect. Provided adequate
action has been taken in the preceding days,
flexibility to cope with the threat as it
increases is retained. Ships intending to sail
will proceed. The smaller units will secure to
their typhoon buoys before winds locally reach
20 knots. Experience has shown that considerable
difficulty can be encountered in securing with
winds above this speed. At about the same time
the Naval Base will be secured to "typhoon
stations . "
Avoiding Action at Sea
13. The decision to sail 3 once taken, poses the
new problem of the best course of action once at
sea. The following section is based on the
experience of the past few years. However 3 the
commanding officer on the spot 3 with his detailed
knowledge of ship and crew 3 must always make his
own personal decision as the situation dictates .
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14. The most oommon case is the tropical ayalone
which ovosses the northern Philippines or moves
through the Bashi Channel on a west-northwest
course. Should a passage close to Hong Kong be
predicted and sailing ordered, the normal pro-
cedure is for the ships to sail southwest to
cross ahead of the typhoon into the southern "safe"
semicircle . Provided sailing is early enough, the
winds and seas will not have got up, and good
progress can be made as the prevailing winds
will be northerly . Ship design must be considered
however. In 1971 a Leander class frigate (with
a low stern) experienced considerable difficulty
in making way with stern wind and seas.
15. An uncommon situation would be a typhoon
moving northeast towards Hong Kong having re-
curved over the western part of the South China
Sea. Here ships would sail to the southeast to
cross ahead of the typhoon' s track. Wind and
sea would be against the ship, and progress
would be likely to be slow.
16. The most difficult case occurs when a typhoon
moves north towards Hong Kong, and much depends on
the meteorological situation. The "safe" semi-
circle lies to the west, but the coastline falls
away to the west-southwest towards Hainan Island.
To the east, in the "non-navigable" semi-circle,
the coastline falls away to the ENE , and an Easterly
course results in a steady increase in searoom.
If recurvature towards the NE is likely, however,
this course is most dangerous . However, should
recurvature have a low probability , this may well
be the best action to take.
Noteworthy points regarding evasion at sea, stressed by
Morrice, deal with three basic directions of threat by a
tropical cyclone:
1 . A tropical cyclone approaching from the southeast
after crossing Luzon, P.I. This case occurs most often
and requires two major criteria for evasion:
a. early sailing on a southwest track in order
to cross well ahead of the tropical cyclone into the "safe"
semicircle; and




Crossing ahead of a typhoon is a serious matter not to
be treated lightly. However, Somervell and Jarrell (1970)
indicated that one of the most successful tactics in the
Pacific involves crossing of the "T" , that is, running down-
wind and down-sea ahead of the typhoon in order to cross the
2
track and reach a position south of the storm. It is
emphasized that "crossing of the track" must be done we 11 in
advance . If not, the speed-of-advance of the ship may be
hampered due to severe seas and swells, and the ship will be
3helplessly trapped in the direct path of the oncoming typhoon.
This tactic should not be attempted unless it can be managed
outside the area covered by the expanded radius of 30 kt winds,
i.e., the danger area (Somervell and Jarrell, 1970).
2. A tropical cyclone approaching from the southwest
(after recurvature or development over the South China Sea).
Again, early departure by a ship on a southeasterly track is
the key in order to avoid as much as possible the head-on
winds and seas that will significantly reduce any intended
speed-of-advance. However, according to climatology (Figure
14), a tropical cyclone approaching from the southwest is
less likely to occur.
3. A tropical cyclone approaching from the south towards
Hong Kong (as in the Typhoon ROSE Case Study seen in Figure
38). This is undoubtedly the greatest threat to the harbor
and unfortunately the most difficult to evade. There is
See Appendix D for a vivid accounting by CDR. F. L.
Taylor, USN , Commanding Officer, USS AGERHOLM (DD-826) and
of the AGERHOLM's ("Aggie's") experiences in evading Typhoon
JOAN (Oct, 1970) in the South China Sea.
3See Appendix E for graphs of ship's reduced speed-of
advance versus sea-state conditions.
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little choice but to run an initial course of 090° True in
order to obtain sea room in which to maneuver. This course
is only acceptable, however, if recurvature towards the north-
east is unlikely. Otherwise, a ship could be easily trapped
in the path of the storm.
Any of the above decisions are difficult ones to make,
but it is incumbent upon the local commander to make a deci-
sion and make it early.
7.3 REMAINING IN PORT
The following problem areas and considerations should be
taken into account if the decision is made to remain in the
harbor (which would apply to smaller ships, such as patrol
craft or minesweepers, unable to outrun and evade at sea,
or those ships unable to put to sea):
1. The possibility exists, at the discretion of the
Commodore-in-Charge , of having to vacate the typhoon buoys
on short notice for a less desirable spot in Western
Anchorage .
2. The danger of ships broken adrift and out of control
doing considerable damage in the tight quarters of the harbor
is a threat.
3. Securing to buoys should be done before winds
reach greater than 20 kt locally in order to prevent undue
difficulty in securing. Note from Section 4 (Table 1) on
the tropical cyclone climatology for Hong Kong that a
tropical cyclone bearing 180° (170°-190°) from Hong Kong
(due south) on the average will produce winds in the harbor
of greater than or equal to 22 kt at a mean distance of 242
n mi 1
4. The holding action of the bottom in the anchorages,
although good, can not be expected to prevent dragging in winds
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of typhoon intensity. In the case study of Typhoon ROSE,
the USS REGULUS (AF-57) experienced extreme anchor drag
prior to grounding, even though steaming to the anchor.
Figure 47 provides a rough means to determine required steam-
ing to the anchor to ease the strain. However, it should be
cautioned that the use of engine power when the ship is
yawing severely may only accentuate the yaw and worsen the
situation instead of easing it (Crenshaw, 1965). Shipboard
radar should be used to establish fixes and obtain relative
4positions to determine the amount of anchor drag encountered.
5. Storm surge effects as a result of a typhoon moving
inland may result in the increase of the mean water level of
2 to 3 ft above normal. This increase may be as high as 6
ft above normal with storm surge coinciding with high tide
and strong southeasterly winds.
4 C0MSEVENTHFLTINST 5000. 1H (dated 29 Feb 1972), Annex
W, Heavy Weather Plan for SOPA Instructions, Hong Kong, is
included in Appendix F. Additionally, for a more detailed
description on securing for heavy weather, the Heavy Weather
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THESE CURVES SHOW THE ENGINE
SPEED REQUIREO TO OFFSET SELECTED
WIND VELOCITIES, ANO ARE COMPUTED




THE CURVES SHOWN WERE DEVELOPED USING THE BASIC FORMULA:
WIND LOAD* R„AV*
WHERE R„ IS EQUAL TO WIND FRICTION FACTOR. (R„ IS GENERALLY TAKEN AS 0.004.)
V IS EQUAL TO WIND VELOCITY IN KNOTS.
A IS EQUAL TO PROJECTED AREA ABOVE THE WATERLINE IN SO. FT.
THREE SETS OF CALCULATIONS WITH VARYING R„ WERE USED.
ILLUSTRATED REPRESENT THE MEAN OF THESE VALUES.
THE PLOTTED VALUES
Figure 47. Engine speed vs. wind velocity for offsetting force
of wind. (From Crenshaw, 1965.)
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8. CONCLUSION
This study of Hong Kong harbor as a possible typhoon
haven must concur with previous conclusions that the harbor
can not be designated a "safe" haven in time of severe winds
and waves associated with the passage of tropical cyclones.
Previous results, as stated in COMSEVENTHFLT INST 5000. 1H,
Annex W, dated 29 Feb 1972, readily indicate that "... it is
considered that Hong Kong is not a suitable haven for Seventh
Fleet units." This is also in agreement with the findings of
the British, that "the Royal Navy does not consider Hong Kong
a suitable haven under typhoon conditions."
The first step to making a safe evasion is in recognizing
that a potential threat to the port of Hong Kong exists, based
on current tropical cyclone warnings (from U. S. FWC/JTWC,
Guam) and a knowledge of past tropical cyclone tracks that have
affected Hong Kong, as (given in the climatology and statistics)
presented in section 4. Smaller ships, such as minesweepers
or patrol craft, unable to outrun and evade at sea, or those
ships unable to put to sea should be thoroughly familiar with
the potential problems of remaining in port as outlined in
paragraph 7.3. It is recommended that all other Fleet units
should take early decisive action to clear Hong Kong harbor
and evade at sea (para. 7.2).
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1. PILOTAGE (From Director of Marine, 19 71)
Although pilotage is not compulsory in
the port, pilots licensed by the Pilotage
Board are available to board ships at either
entrance on request . The Hong Kong Pilots
Association, with 22 licensed Hong Kong





Pilots generally board inbound ships using
the eastern entrance in the vicinity of the
Lei Yue Mun turning buoy (latitude 22° 16.4'
north, longitude 114° 15.3' east) and disembark
at the same point from outward-bound ships.
At the western entrance, pilots embark
and disembark to the west of Green Island.
It is a contravention of regulation 3(1)
of the Merchant Shipping (Control of Ports)
Regulations , 1953 as amended by the Merchant
Shipping (Control of Ports) (Amendment)
Regulations , 1965, for any vessel to pick up
or discharge a pilot within a distance of 7.5
cables from the center of either the Lei Yue
Mun Pass or Sulphur Channel.
2. TOWAGE FACILITIES (From Marine Dept. Hong Kong,
1970)
Commercial towage facilities are as listed
in the following paragraph. Masters of vessels
who may be required to shift berth in the event
of a tropical cyclone affecting the Colony,
should bear in mind that the services of tugs
are at a premium immediately before and following
the passing of a tropical cyclone . Tugs are
then generally employed in shifting vessels to
and from dockyards . Calls for towage assistance
should therefore be kept to a minimum and made




Name B.H.P. Bollard Pull
(Tons)
Owner/Manager
Whampoa 1160 18 Hong Kong &
Whampoa Dock
Co. Ltd.
Hung Horn 1600 25 Hong Kong &
Whampoa Dock
Co. Ltd.
Hong Kong Docks 1000 10. 75 Hong Kong &
Whampoa Dock
Co. Ltd.
Edith 440 5. 1 Hong Kong &
Whampoa Dock
Co. Ltd.
Taikoo 1600 30 Taikoo Dockyard
and Engineering
Co. Ltd.
Taikoo Shun-0 1000 10. 75 Taikoo Dockyard
and Engineering
Co. Ltd.
Wanohun 1000 12 Taikoo Dockyard
and Engineering
Co. Ltd.
Taikoo Wan lee 1700 24 Taikoo Dockyard
and Engineering
Co. Ltd.
Golden Cape 1900 18.5 Mollers Limited.
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3. TYPHOON MOORINGS (From Marine Dept., Hong Kong,
1970)
A. General Classification
In Hong Kong harbor the following moorings
are, at -present 3 approved for use as special
typhoon moorings:
(a) "A" class for vessels not exceeding
600 feet (182.9 meters) in length.
A 4 to A 19, A 21 to 40.
A total of 36 moorings
.
(b) "B" class for vessels not exceeding
370 feet (112.8 meters) in length.
B 5, B 7 to B 9, B 11 3 B 13, B 16,
B 18 to B 22 and B 26.
A total of 13 moorings .
The above list is subject to amendment and
up-to-date information may be obtained from the
Port Control Office, Marine Department
.
The distance between Government mooring buoys
in Hong Kong harbor is 1,400 feet (426.7 meters)
in the case of "A" class typhoon moorings and 1,000
feet (304.8 meters) in the case of "B " class
moorings
.
B. Composition of Typhoon Moorings (From Marine
Dept. , Hong Kong, 1970)
(a) "A" class typhoon moorings are
comprised of two 9-fathom lengths of
3h inches (8.9 cm) stud link cast
steel cable, with a swivel fitted
between the two lengths , secured to
a 90-ton concrete sinker consisting of
a 30-ton base block and a 40-ton saddle.
The buoy fittings , cable, swivel and
shackles are tested to a strain of 247
tons when new. They are inspected every
twelve months and cables are turned end
for end every alternate year. The
minimum size of chain permitted, with
weardown, is 3 inches (7.7 cm).
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(b) "B" class typhoon moorings are of a
similar composition except that the
size of chain is 3 inches (7.7 cm) and
the concrete block is 50 tons. Compo-
nents are tested to 204 tons when new
and the minimum size of chain permitted
is 2% inches (6.4 cm).
4. TYPHOON INSTRUCTIONS FOR FOREIGN WARSHIPS
COMMODORE-IN- CHARGE > HONG KONG MEMORANDUM DATED
5 MAI 1967
1. This memorandum replaces my memo No. HK.
10/73/3 dated 14th May 3 1966 which should be
destroyed. It should be attached to the front





Commanding Officers of Foreign Warships
visiting Hong Kong during the Typhoon Season
are requested to make themselves familiar with
these Orders IMMEDIATELY upon ARRIVAL .
Commanding Officers of United States Warships
are requested to return their copies to the
Commanding Officer United States Ship acting as
Senior Officer Present Afloat (ADMIN) before
sailing j other ships are requested to return
their copies to the Operations Room 3 H.M.S. TAMAR.
3. As the timings of any particular action
may be dependent upon the berth occupied 3 the
following brief notes on berths are designed
to help the U.S.N. Senior Officer Present Afloat
and the Commanding Officers to be ready for
likely moves. It will be appreciated that orders
to move may be received from the Commodore-in-
Charge 3 Hong Kong 3 for those ships at Naval berths.
(Paragraph 5 (a) (b)). Orders from the Director
of Marine for those ships at commercial moorings
not listed as requiring automatic vacation will
be passed through the Commo dore-in- Charge 3 Hong Kong
4 Communications During Typhoon Sorties
a. As normal communication links cease to
be available when Foreign Warships
have sailed 3 such ships which intend
to return to Hong Kong should maintain
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constant watch on 4304 Kcs. (C.W.)
with Hong Kong Naval Wireless (Call
Sign GZO) . Ships in company should
arrange communication guards as
requisite
.
b. Berthing instructions on return to
harbor will be passed on this circuit
and ships are requested to keep the
Commodore-in- Charge , Hong Kong
informed of their movements
.
c. Small ships which remain in harbor
should maintain constant watch on
British Harbor Intercom (277.0 Mas)
with Hong Kong Naval Wireless (Call
Sign FLAG)
.







(No. I to 4)
All must be vacated
at discretion of the
Commodore- in- Charge 3
Hong Kong in suffi-
cient time to lift
catamarans, etc.
All these moorings are
up to the standards
for Typhoon Moorings
and may be occupied
at discretion of the






















s of a Typhoon
ther than I
ing hoisted,
a time it may
too late for
get clear to
d. Commercial B.28 3
A. 41, A. 42 .
These are similar to
c. except that they
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Commercial A. 4 to
A. 16, A. 19, A. 21




f. Commercial A. 35






and they are likely
to be required as such
any time after Typhoon
Signal No. I is hoisted.
These are Typhoon
Moorings for ships not
exceeding 600 feet in
length. Ships may be
required by the Director
of Marine to vacate these
berths to provide room
for dead ships from
local shipyards
.
These are Typhoon Moor-
ings for ships not ex-
ceeding 600 feet in
length but are reserved
for berthing dead ships
from Taikoo & Kowloon
Dockyards and as such
they would require auto-
matic vacation on the
hoisting of No. I Typhoon
Signal. The Dockyards
start moving promptly
and nearly always before
No. 3 is hoisted.
g . Commercial B . 5 ,
B . 7 , B . II , B . 13 ,







These are Typhoon Moor-
ings for ships up to
370 feet in length.
Those are not Typhoon
Moorings and must be
vacated as in c.
5. TYPHOON ANCHORAGES (From Marine Dept. , Hong Kong, 1970)
Junk Bay and the eastern approaches to Hong
Kong harbor are not considered to be suitable areas
in which to anchor during typhoons 3 and there is no
longer any space available in Kowloon Bay for use
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as a typhoon anchorage. The most popular
anchorage during the passage of tropical
cyclones is on or to the westward of Kellett
Bank (latitude 22° 18' N., longitude 114°
06.5' E.) where the depth of water varies
from 3 fathoms to 12 fathoms.
When anchoring for an impending tropical
cyclone 3 ample cable should be paid out at
once without waiting until the force of the
storm is felt as paying out then tends to
disturb the anchor. Ships should always have
their second anchor ready for letting go and
use it before the winds reach gale force.
New arrivals should ensure that the
clamps and bolts securing the spare anchor
are not corroded so that in the event of
losing an anchor this spare unit can be




Figures B-l through B-14 represent monthly and half
monthly cl imatologi cal tracks (March to December) of tropical
cyclones in WESTPAC which at some time were of typhoon
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Table C-l. Beaufort wind force scale conversion to knots






















Up to 33 knots













The (Real) Live Adventures of
n and Aggie" in
the South China Sea
On 15-16 October 1970, USS Agerholm (DD-826) rode out Typhoon Joan in the South
China Sea (chart at left). Joan was a typhoon of medium intensity, with winds of 100 knots
near her center, 75 knots to 50 miles and 50 knots to 200 miles. At one point Agerholm
passed within about 60 miles of Joan's center, in the navigable semicircle behind the storm.
This narrative is being written only 15 hours after clearing the danger area. The ship is a
shambles. As I toured her this morning I could only feel fortunate that we had come
through. During the storm, when the worst which could happen did happen, we survived
only because of prompt action and "blind" luck. There were mistakes made, an essential
part of this narrative I make no effort to hide. Of utmost importance are the lessons learned,
and in many instances learned again, and these I set forth in the hope that others may
benefit from Aggie's experience. The experience was truly a frightening one, and as I look
back, the issue was in doubt on several occasions. Agerholm apparently had nine lives and I
am certain that she used a number of these during the 30-odd hours of the storm.
By CDR F. L. Taylor, USN
Commanding Officer, USS Agerholm (DD-826)
AGERHOLM was operating on 14 October as a
screening destroyer for Task Group 77.6 in the Tonkin
Gulf. Typhoon Joan had been reported for almost a
week and had crossed the Philippines south of Manila,
heading west across the South China Sea. We completed
refueling from the USS Wichita at midnight and were
detached for an independent transit to Hong Kong. At
about 0500 on the 15th some effects of weather were
felt as the ship rounded the southern portion of Hainan
Island. As we continued on a NE track during the
forenoon the weather became increasingly rough, with
wind and moderate seas from 020° *, and an occasional
large swell from about 060 . This combination of sea
and swell made it impossible to select a "good" course.
Several swells crested on a height even with the bridge.
One particularly large swell took the UHF can-type
antenna off the top of Mount 51 and threatened to
break out the pilot house windows.
* All compass headings and bearings arc given as true.
Consequently, we reversed course along our original
track. A review of weather warnings indicated this area
to be an area of high seas for the next 12 hours. Our
intent was to run back along Hainan Island until the
unfavorable weather improved and then proceed again to
Hong Kong. We did not, at this time, associate the heavy
swells with Typhoon Joan, reported to be 350 miles to
the southeast.
During this period I observed from the bridge a
four-inch nylon line and a fire hose adrift on the foc'sle.
These and other deck gear, including several large
fenders from the unrep, were secured for sea. At some
time during this period Agerholm lost the first of three
inflatable lifeboats. Later in the afternoon the pad eye
securing the outboard gripes on the motor whaleboat
pulled out of the deck. A jury-rig jigger was attached and
this held the boat secure throughout the storm.
At about 0130 on 16 October the ship was running
southwest at 12 knots. Wind and seas continued




Figure D-l. Track of the USS AGERHOLM. (Note: At approxi-
mately 161515 water depth dropped to less than 500 fathoms
At 161640, partly because of the water depth readings, the
Navigator revised the estimated position to the south.)
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they indicated that Joan would go over land about 90
miles south of Danang. Rather than proceed south and
closer to the possible path of the storm, the decision was
made to turn about and lie to. 1 had some qualms about
making the turn with the heavy sea state, but word was
passed to stand by for heavy rolls and the turn was made
without difficulty. Turns for seven knots were indicated
and the ship rode fairly well, with a great deal of
pitching. Radar held several peaks on Hainan Island and
bearings or these showed the ship to be making no speed
over the ground. At about this time we first associated
the heavy ground swell with Typhoon Joan.
Throughout the rest of the night and for the next 20
hours I did not leave the pilot house. At about 0500 we
received a report from the steering engineroom that
there was "a lot of water" in the space. 1 had previously
directed the boatswains mate of the watch to ensure
that maximum watertight integrity be maintained in the
steering engineroom. There was some initial difficulty in
finding out what had happened, and more difficulty in
getting response to remove the water. After a very trying
period the engineer officer reported to the bridge that
two large stanchions had -been torn off the fantai]
leaving two gaping holes into the steering engineroom. I
subsequently learned that the missing stanchions
belonged to the large towing wire reel, which
mysteriously departed the fantail, leaving all of the
lifelines and snaking intact. Henceforth we kept
three men in the steering engineroom to provide
response to any casualty. The helm was in constant
motion as the helmsman tried to maintain the ship's
heading into the seas.
At sunrise we were greeted by an endless procession
of huge seas sweeping by, most of them with foaming
tops from the high wind. Shortly after sunrise the
steering alarm sounded and the bridge lost steering
control. While we desperately attempted to maintain our
heading by engines, the after steering room reported a
fire in the electrical junction box and a complete loss of
power to after steering. Very fortunately the rudder was
nearly amidships and the bridge was able to maintain
heading by using the engines until manual steering could
be set up. Once this was accomplished, steering was
easier (but sluggish because of the time and effort
involved in manual steering). The loss of power was
determined to have been caused by water dripping
through the vent to the main deck. The electrical
junction box was jury-rigged and approximately one
hour later the bridge was back in control. The power
panel and the steering motors themselves were covered
by canvas or plastic as protection against water.
By 0700 on the 16th we were pitching heavily and
winds were gusting to 55 knots. Shortly thereafter the
latest report on Joan indicated that the storm had
turned and was proceeding northwest, directly toward
us, at a distance of about 1 80 miles. There was no longer
any doubt as to the source of our troubles.
The answer to our wondering which direction we
should evade in was readily arrived at, since we could
make no headway in any direction except downwind.
Even this might put us across the path of the storm, in
which case we might have to run ahead of the storm, up
into the Gulf of Tonkin distinctly unfriendly
territory.
The decision to turn the ship downwind was a
distressing one to make because I felt she might roll over
in the 40-foot seas, even though fully loaded with fuel.
Visibility was extremely restricted because of flying
spray and mist and it was impossible to pick an optimum
time for the turn. All hands were advised of the situation
and directed to keep lifejackets ready for immediate use.
A flash message was then transmitted to operational
commanders advising them of our intended action.
Shortly after 0800 on the 16th 1 directed the OOD to
bring the ship about. I stood on the wing of the bridge
trying to pick an optimum time. Wind and flying spray
made it difficult to see and hear. The officer of the deck
immediately put his rudder over and ordered full speed
on the outboard screw and a standard bell on the
inboard to provide good rudder control. Agerholm was
caught by a 30-foot swell on the beam as she came
smartly around. This large swell simply lifted the ship up
and dropped her again, with little rolling motion. 1 was
fully convinced by now that if several large steep
swells caught her broadside during the turn she might
roll over. Succeeding experience proved this lack of
confidence in my "Fram 1" to be unjustified.
As we steadied on a downwind course of about 220°,
there was a very noticeable air of relief on the bridge.
The relative wind intensity dropped to about 35 knots
with a corresponding drop in noise, and the ship
appeared to be proceeding easily down the face of the
large swells. Steering control was somewhat difficult and
speed was increased to 15 knots. Immediately thereafter,
Agerholm had her stern picked up by a large swell and
she careened wildly off to the right to broach to in the
trough of the swell, heeling over to port at an extreme
angle which I estimated to be in excess of 50 degrees.
One could have stepped out of the port pilot house door
directly into the sea. I had a premonition of the end. but
surprisingly enough she righted herself to an
angle of about 30 degrees, where she was held bv an
estimated 60-knot wind. Somehow we were able to
regain control; as 1 remember, it was through an initial
burst of speed on both engines followed by a backing
bell on the inboard (port) engine that we were able to
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preclude the same incident from occurring again.
At this point I was thoroughly surprised at still having
a ship, and my confidence had vastly increased. This
confidence made my next 1 2 hours a little easier.
We quickly learned that with winds of 50 knots or
more aft of the beam, the ship was extremely difficult to
hold downwind. Each time the ship broached on a sea,
or tried to. the wind would push the stern downwind,
down the slope ol the swell, and force the bow around
to windward. The only effective means of preventing
this was to uSe speed to provide rudder control. Hut here
again. excessive speed could easily lead to
"surfbourding" down a swell with a high probability of
broaching. Through a nerve-racking trial and error
period, we discovered that with the starboard engine
ahe.id standard and the port engine ahead one-third we
could easily maintain good helm control. We actually
used this engine combination for most of the next 12
hours, until out of the storm's danger area.
Throughout the entire period we were attempting to
keep the seas on the starboard quarter in order to open
from the storm's center. Had the seas been on the
opposite quarter, the opposite engine combination
would have been equally effective.
Having found a workable means of maintaining our
downwind heading, we settled into a routine to ride out
the storm. As each large swell passed the ship she would
settle into the following trough and appear tp be making
no way through the water. The succeeding swell would
lift the stern and at the same time the bow would bury
itselt in the trough, with only the jackstaff pedestal
remaining visible forward of Mount 51.
As the ship moved higher on the face of the
approaching sea she would slowly pick up forward
motion, her progress being marked by the jackstaff
proceeding through the white water like a submarine
periscope, until finally the bow would surface and the
ship would drop over the crest into another trough.
During each of these cycles Agerholm's speed would
appear to increase from zero to an estimated 15 knots.
It became increasingly apparent that wc were now
slaves of the storm, being committed to run downwind
in an attempt to open the storm center. I spent much of
the early downwind period watching huge swells come
up astern and coaching the OOD right or left a little to
minimize the tendency for these swells to broach the
ship. The seas were Very large, steep and confused,
indicating that wc were quite close to the storm center.
Large swells routinely came cresting by at a level above
the pilot house. Occasionally seas on opposing courses
would come together, ejecting gysers 60 feet or more
into the air. A look in any direction gave the appearance
of a maelstrom in which no ship could survive, and we
were in the middle.
Since reversing course at 0800 wc had had no means
of navigation and an accurate DR track was almost
impossible to plot. By rule of thumb (face the wind and
the storm center lies 1 15 degrees to the right) the storm
center was farther north than reported and probably
quite close. This estimate was later found to be highly
accurate. Of immediate concern was the fact that the
wind was slowly backing, thus Agerholm's course was
continually shifting to the south and cast. We knew that
the Paracel Islands were some 60 miles to the southeast.
Avoiding these became one ol my primary concerns.
With the standard/one-third engine combination I
assumed our speed to be about eight knots. As a
precaution I calculated bur approach to the Paraccls at
12 knots and maintained a close watch on the
depth-sounder. Radar was useless and visibility at all
times was less than one mile. At about 1430, somewhat
sooner than I had anticipated, the fathometer gave an
indication of shoaling water which 1 correctly assumed
to be the Paracel Group. I further assumed, incorrectly,
that this would be the North Reef, but 1 had no idea of
where the island lay. Visibility was extremely restricted
and every large swell periodically broke into a giant
surflinc. I conned the ship past this first reef by
fathometer information with a distinctly sick feeling in
the pit of my stomach, straining to see anything that
might be surf, with the intention of immediately
bringing the ship about in the event I could identify
anything, or if the fathometer indicated rapidly shoaling
water. The fact that I could probably make no headway,
even if I should successfully make the turn, remained in
my mind.
Soon the water deepened again and I felt security in the
knowledge that I thought 1 knew where we were and when
to expect the last remaining island, and we adjusted the
ship's head to the left to pass clear. Several hours later
the fathometer again indicated shoaling water. Wc had
been proceeding downwind on a course of 100°, plus or
minus 10 degrees. I assumed that this would be the
Amphitritc Group and that Agerholm would pass just to
the north. Consequently our 'heading was changed to
070 which placed the wind and seas about 30 degrees
on the port quarter, at a point where almost full right
rudder was required to prevent broaching. On this
heading the wind heeled the ship over to a constant
20-30 degrees, which increased each time a following sea
passed. Fathometer indications were consistent with
where I thought the ship to be, and it was with a distinct
feeling of relief that we passed this island and again
entered deep water.
By dark, Agerholm was riding well, having crossed
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behind the storm center .it a range estimated to have
been 60 miles. Wc were able to open the storm on a
course of 090°, although seas were still mountainous
and the true wind remained between 65-80 knots. At
about 1930 on the 16th we had a radar contact at 077 .
16 miles. After an evaluation that the contact had no
course or speed, someone wiser than 1 compared our
fathometer reading with the reciprocal bearing and range
from Woody Island in the Amphitrite Island Group. The
depth compared perfectly and as we approached Woody
Island the comparison proved correct. Another course
change to 110 was made to pass safely. Lincoln Island
was detected and passed shortly thereafter.
Reconstruction based upon these final sightings
indicated that we had been making a fairly steady 17
knots, running with the seas on the standard/one-third
combination. This was double what we believed our
speed to be, and of course put the ship well south o'f our
DR position and into the Paracel Group. Laying out the
ship's track in reverse indicated that we had not, in fact,
passed North Reef or the Amphitrite Islands close
aboard, but that we were obtaining soundings in the
relatively shallow waters to the south.
Maneuvering was still restricted in that we could not
turn more than 30 degrees off the downwind course.
The wind, however, dropped occasionally to
55 knots and for the first time the barometer
increased, having dropped some .80 of an
inch over the last day and a half to a low of 28.80. By
2100 on the 16th the ship was riding easily, relative
wind was between 35 and 45 knots, backing, with the
seas more stable. We were thus able to maintain our
desired 090° heading. I left the bridge for the first time
in almost 24 hours.
As I look back, the wind was the predominant factor
with which we had to contend. Seas were generally
mountainous but when the true wind speed remained
between 50-60 knots it was not too diffiralt running
downwind. Periodically, however, the wind would
increase to 70-80 knots. During these periods the seas
would quickly increase in height and appear to run in
several directions, cresting white foam continuously.
Visibility decreased radically and noise intensity
increased. Maintaining a downwind heading became
increasingly difficult, and the ship would be boarded by
successive seas. One could hear and feel each swell as it
rumbled from aft along the ship. Wc were surrounded by
white water and flying spray The total effect was
frightening and the question foremost in everyone's
mind was "When will this end?" or "How much longer
can we take it?" By comparison, when the wind dropped
to 40-50 knots it was almost like a Sunday afternoon at
the park.
Ship's routine while in the storm was. of course,
greatly disrupted. Help was needed everywhere. Spaces
and passageways had to be dewatered, loose equipment
had to be secured and extra watches stood. It was
interesting to observe that as ship motion became
increasingly violent, seasickness all but disappeared. All
hands were fighting to save the ship.
Repair personnel in all departments had little sleep in
two days. Electrical fires were epidemic. Water was
coming into the ship at some new place every hour, and
vital electrical and electronic equipment had to be
watched around the clock. Under these conditions, three
and even two section watches became impractical.
No attempt was even made to serve complete meals.
Sandwiches and simple but hot entrees that could be
eaten on the run or carried off to the working spaces in
paper plates and cups proved most acceptable.
Early in the storm even minor rolls were accompanied
by crashing, banging and, frequently, loud talking. This
diminished with successively more severe rolls until the
50 degree plus roll. After that, each roll was
accompanied by an unusual silence, since everything had
found a place, although not necessarily the right place.
Agerholm today is undoubtedly the best secured ship
in the fleet, and, at the moment, also the messiest. No
one in this crew will ever need to have explained the
necessity of "securing for sea."
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Lessons Learned
1. In preparing a ship for sea. all topsidi' equipment
must be securely stowed and lashed down. Once heavy
weather is encountered it is either too late or extremely
hazardous. In particular, fire hoses should be secured in
their stowages so that the bitter end cannot come adrift
and subsequently drag out the rest of the hose.
2. Maintaining steering control is of utmost importance
in heavy weather. While the tearing of holes in the deck
above the steering cngineroom could not be anticipated,
it is a common problem to have hoth the scuttle and the
air vent leak due to poor maintenance. These items need
routine attention when the ship is in port. The scuttle is
a particular problem because on the 2250 Class, and
probably others, the electrical junction box is almost
directly under it.
It is also highly advisable to have additional people,
one of whom is an electrician, standing by in the steering
cngineroom to assist in the event of a casualty during
heavy weather conditions.
3. When turning the ship under extreme conditions of
wind and sea. use full or flank speed on the outboard
engine and standard on the inboard, or some similar
combination which will put speed on the ship. Do NOT
back the inboard engine. The result of backing will be to
make the ship wallow in her turn and cause the rudder
to be useless.
4. With winds of over 50 knots acting on the ship aft of
the beam she will have a very strong tendency to broach
into the wind. I believe this characteristic to be
accentuated by, if not entirely due to, the Dash hangar
on the- Frams. Since speed was required to maintain good
rudder control, and excessive speed would lead to
"surfboarding." a combination of one engine ahead
standard with the other ahead one-third offered good
control and enabled us to keep the seas on the quarter of
the standard engine in order to open from the storm
center.
5. Each commander, when committing himself to a
course of action to avoid a storm, should recognize that
he may, in fact, remain committed to that course of
action with no alternatives. In Agerholm's case when the
decision was made to run downwind the only possible
alternative would have been to run to the right, up into
the Tonkin Gulf. I believe now that the very small
latitude for maneuvering would have precluded even
this. I did not consider that 1 wourd be forced to steam
blindly through the Paracel Islands, nor did I realize that
I would be close enough to the storm center to render
radar and visual assistance useless. The awareness that in
a severe storm you will have little control over the ship
and little or no position information should weigh
heavily on the course-of-action decision.
Major Equipment Lost
three nylon mooring lines (one 5", two 4")




five lengths of 2'/i" firehose
10 lengths of 1 Vi" firehose (Note 1)
three 10-foot applicators
three P-250 gasoline cans
two nylon boat falls (4 ) — (badly chafed,
requiring replacement)
Note 1. In several instances a lost firehose was
connected to a deck riser and the entire riser (fireplug)
was torn out of the deck.
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APPENDIX E
The following figures, E-l and E-2 , represent the
estimated resultant speed-of-advance of a ship in a given
sea condition. The original relationships were based on
data of speed versus sea state, obtained from many ships
by James (1957), and they should not be regarded as truly
representative of any particular ship (Nagle, 1972).
For example, from Figure E-l, for a ship making 15 kt
with waves of 16 ft approaching from 030° (relative to the
ship's heading) one can expect the speed-of-advance to be
slowed to about 9 kt. Twenty-foot seas, under the same
condition, would result in a speed-of-advance of slightly
less than 6 kt. However, it is emphasized that these
figures are averages and the true values will vary slightly




























SHIP SPEED IN (knots)
Figure E-l. Ship speed as a function of wave height and wave





























Figure E-2. Ship speed as a function of wave height and wave





HEAVY WEATHER PLAN (From COMSEVENTHFLTINST 5000. 1H SOPA
Instructions Hong Kong B. C. C, dated 29 Feb 1972)
1 . TYPHOON READINESS
a. COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201, ANNEX W, furnishes perti-
nent information concerning Typhoon Readiness and establishes
special reporting requirements for ships in a severe weather
situation. The Typhoon Doctrine for the USNAVPHIL area,
including Hong Kong, is contained in COMUSNAVPHIL OPORD 201,
ANNEX W, Appendix II. SOPA (ADMIN) will make the ships
present report required by that directive, but will modify
the format and report only U. S. Navy ships.
b. FLEWEACEN/JTWC Guam is responsible for providing
tropical storm warnings for all typhoons, tropical storms
and tropical depressions occurring west of 180 degrees longi-
tude. These warnings are transmitted via appropriate fleet
and general broadcasts. Storm warnings are also broadcast
on Hong Kong Harbor Common. The Hong Kong Royal Observatory
located in Kowloon issues warnings when the Hong Kong area
is threatened, using Signal Nos . 1, 3, 5 (8 NW) 6 (8 SW),
7 (8NE) , 8 (8 SE), 9, and 10 and strong wind signals. These
signals and their meanings are found in Tab A to Appendix II,
Annex W, COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201 and the Appendix to Hong
Kong General Order No. 112, issued by Commodore-in-Charge
,
Hong Kong. Relevant sections of the latter will be distri-
buted to U. S. Navy ships by SOPA (ADMIN). Commanding
Officers are required to be familiar with this order.
c. Upon the hoisting of a local warning signal, No. 1
or higher, SOPA and all U. S. Navy ships present in Hong
Kong will be guided by the provisions of Hong Kong General
Order No. 0150 and are expected to conform to the recommen-
dations of Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong, and to depart in
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a timely and orderly fashion if requested. Commanding
officers should not hesitate to request permission from SOPA
to get underway prior to a general sortie, if such action is
deemed expedient. Because of the somewhat reduced number of
Naval buoys now maintained at Hong Kong, it is probable that
all buoys suitable for use in typhoon weather will be required
for British Naval ships. In these circumstances, the timely
vacating of the Naval buoys upon receipt of instructions from
the Commodore-i n-Charge , Hong Kong is essential.
d. During the typhoon season (15 May through 31 October)
ships are to moor to buoys with two bridles (normally one
chain and one spring lay or wire rope) and have engineering
plants on four hours notice. A ship which anticipates a
condition that would prevent getting underway on four hours
notice during typhoon season, or eight hours notice at other
times, will report by message to SOPA and SOPA (ADMIN) giving
reason and expected duration of the existing conditions of
readi ness
.
e. Ships present in Hong Kong will immediately notify
SOPA and SOPA (ADMIN) when disabled. SOPA (ADMIN) will keep
Commodore-in-Charge , Hong Kong advised in order that he might
make suitable provisions for typhoon berths.
f. Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong issues a "Daily
State" which contains typhoon berth assignments for the port
of Hong Kong. This "Daily State" is distributed to all
U. S. Navy ships present by guard mail. HMS TAMAR maintains
a current list of typhoon buoys.
g. As a result of a 1966 evaluation of Hong Kong as
a typhoon haven, it is considered that Hong Kong is not a
suitable typhoon haven for SEVENTH Fleet units. The typhoon
instructions for Hong Kong provide, in general, for putting
to sea or remaining in port. For ships that remain in port,
either a typhoon buoy or an anchorage to the west or south-
west of Stonecutters Island may be assigned as a typhoon
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berth. Although the decision of SOPA will govern in each
case, it is considered that putting to sea is the preferred
alternative. All portions of paragraph 6 of Appendix II to
Annex W of COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201 should be weighed care-
fully before a decision is made to remain in port in Hong
Kong during a typhoon. All sorties from Hong Kong for
typhoon evasion should be made early due to limited sea room
in the northern portion of the South China Seas.
h. Ships under sortie for temporary typhoon evacuation
will guard special circuits as required by paragraph 4(b)
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